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       This Article analyzes peace agreements in regions with a history of ethno-religious conflicts to determine if 
there are correlations between the form and substance of the agreements and their successful implementation. For 
purposes of comparison, I examine several agreements between India and Pakistan, the historic agreement between 
Israel and Egypt, and the Darfur Peace Agreement, as exemplars of similar conflict situations where a study of 
agreement design has salience. I endeavour to apply the legalization theory articulated by Kenneth Abbott, et al., to 
test the explanatory power of the obligation-precision-delegation matrix. [FN1] The Kashmir dispute has raged on 
for over five decades and has consumed thousands of lives making the region one of the most dangerous conflict 
zones in the modern world. [FN2] The terrible price, both in terms of human lives and defense expenditures, has not 
made much of an impact in pushing the parties towards finding a peaceful solution. [FN3] This *404 indifference to 
cost is not unique--several other dyads that are deeply sundered by ethnic and religious divisions share the same 
disregard for human suffering with the same devastating consequences. [FN4] The fragility of peace in these conflict 
zones and the fluctuation of rhetoric depending on the regime in power have meant that hope for a peaceful 
settlement is slim, [FN5] which might explain the shortage of significant attention to the analysis of such peace 
negotiations and agreements by legal scholars. The closed and secret nature of the negotiations and the low 
involvement of the legal community in them have contributed to this state of affairs. One consequence of such 
indifference has been the repetition of the same features in agreements despite evidence of failure. The scholarly 
community has to analyze the agreements to unearth avenues that can maximize the probability of better outcomes if 
the situation is to improve. [FN6] Scholarly attention to the design and structure of agreements between these parties 
can help us to understand whether there is a correlation between the choice of form and substance and their 
successful implementation. [FN7] Legal scholars have deferred for too long to the view that politics, rather than 
*405 law, is the answer to these disputes. This deference is fundamentally flawed and an examination of the 
agreements using legalization theory may help to bridge the gap between law and politics. It will cast light on the 
role of law in solving disputes characterized by ethno-religious hatreds, and will demonstrate that contract-like 
forms are preferable for agreement design. I analyze agreements between India and Pakistan, Israel and Egypt, and 
the Darfur Peace Agreement, to demonstrate that agreements that are high on the precision-obligation-delegation 
matrix enjoy higher degrees of success than those that are low on this matrix when concluded in dispute scenarios 
involving ethno-religious conflicts. I conclude by arguing that India and Pakistan should aim for hard legalization to 
solve the Kashmir dispute, and that they must learn from the painful experience of the Darfur Peace Agreement and 
include non-state actors as signatories to any agreement. 
 
I. Legalization Theory 
 
       Legalization theory argues that states choose to legalize their agreements when the issue is one of commitment 
or coordination with the objective being to benefit from cooperative action. [FN8] According to this view, there is a 
cost- benefit analysis that states engage in when deciding whether or not to legalize, with the choice depending on 
legalization's ability to deliver outcomes that are more beneficial than non-legalization. [FN9] Some of these 
benefits include the ability of legalization to supply credibility to commitments, to lower ex post transaction costs, 
and to supply monitoring mechanisms. [FN10] Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal posit that harder legalization 
makes state commitments more credible by creating precise agreements which contain obligations of a higher order. 
[FN11] They argue that transaction costs ex ante are higher with hard legalization because of the difficulty of 
negotiation and *406 obtaining agreement on these sorts of agreements. [FN12] It is likely that, as the levels of 
obligation and precision increase, the more difficult it will be for states to bind themselves because of the fear of 
being in breach of these obligations and the minimizing of wiggle room to make excuses. [FN13] This increased 
cost ab initio may be offset by lowered costs after agreement has been reached, because the existence of precise 
obligations makes enforcement easier and because many hard legalized agreements create tribunals for interpretation 
and enforcement. [FN14] Monitoring costs are thus reduced and may justify the expenditure of resources ab initio. 
[FN15] Abbott and Snidal also point to sovereignty costs (by which they mean incursions on state sovereignty in the 
subject area) as being a factor that can militate against hard legalization. “They hypothesize that a combination of 
high uncertainty and low sovereignty costs will lead to institutions with lower precision coupled with higher 
obligation and moderate delegation. High sovereignty costs and lower uncertainty are likely to produce greater 
precision and obligation with less delegation.” [FN16] 
 
       The relative power relationship between states is also a factor in determining the extent to which legalization 
occurs. More powerful states have little or no incentives to legalize when dealing with less powerful states as they 
may be able to obtain outcomes that they want without resorting to legalization. Kahler argues that the power 
asymmetry argument is “heavily qualified” by the fact that the strongest advocates for legalization are the United 
States and Europe, two of the strongest international actors. [FN17] Abbott and Snidal suggest that there is a 
preference for softer forms of legalization when powerful states are involved, upon the understanding that there will 
be long term advantages in the form of lowered transaction costs. [FN18] *407 Kahler suggests that asymmetries 
may extend beyond those involving mere power (there may be asymmetries in terms of legal skills) that explain the 
unwillingness of some states, particularly developing ones, to legalize agreements. [FN19] 
 
II. Case Studies 
 
A. India-Pakistan 
 
       India and Pakistan attained independence in August of 1947, Pakistan celebrating its freedom on the 14th while 
India observing its birth as a nation on the 15th. Statehood on communal lines following British colonialism was the 
result of an acrimonious process of partitioning pre-independent India into Muslim Pakistan, and predominantly 
Hindu India. [FN20] This redrawing of the maps saw one of the biggest human relocations in history as people 
uprooted and moved from villages and towns that they had called home for generations.  [FN21] Such a birth was 
*408 not conducive to a peaceful co-existence. [FN22] From the beginning there was rancor over the princely state 
of Kashmir, which had not acceded to India or Pakistan as of August 15, 1947. [FN23] Strenuous efforts were 
underway on both sides to get Kashmir to join either, and the situation was complicated by the fact that the king of 
Kashmir was a Hindu while the majority of his subjects were Muslims. [FN24] The king seemed to prefer 
independence, as he neither wanted to be part of an Islamic country by joining Pakistan, nor did he want to cede 
power by joining secular India. Ultimately, on October 26, 1947 the king, seeing that he had very little choice, 
signed the Instrument of Accession and Kashmir became a part of India. [FN25] Paragraph 4 of the Instrument of 
Accession clearly states that “I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India . . . .” [FN26] The Schedule, 
which enumerates legislative powers, states that *409 the Dominion legislature (India) shall have the power to make 
laws with regard to military and defense matters. [FN27] In addition, India also has the power to make law with 
regard to external relations. [FN28] This accession was hotly contested by Pakistan and a limited war broke out 
between the two countries just a few months after independence in 1948. [FN29] The festering conflict over this act 
of accession has resulted in three wars and several skirmishes. [FN30] Kashmir has become the central feature of the 
relationship between the two countries, and movement on other contested issues is very difficult without addressing 
this matter. [FN31] 
 
       1. Agreements Between the Parties. This section analyzes the agreements between the parties in terms of 
structure and design. The first agreement of significance is the 1960 Indus River Waters Treaty. Given the hurried 
nature of the partition of pre-independent India and the spread of the resources, it was inevitable that fights would 
break out over arbitrarily carved boundaries. Most pregnant with potential for such a fight was the river Indus, much 
more than a body of water for most Indians. With the partition of the Indus Basin, and the breadbasket state of 
Punjab, Pakistani Punjab was dependant on irrigation facilities that were located in India. When the dispute 
threatened to escalate, the World Bank stepped in to facilitate negotiations. [FN32] After about a decade of *410 
negotiation, Pakistan President Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Treaty at 
Karachi in 1960. [FN33] 
 
       Throughout the process the World Bank was strongly engaged in the negotiations frequently advancing the talks 
by placing proposals and even raising funds to overcome objections. [FN34] The World Bank was even a signatory 
to the treaty. [FN35] Giving up the idea that a shared utilization plan would be the best option from a resource-
allocation standpoint [FN36] because the political hostilities did not allow for it, [FN37] the treaty devised an 
elaborate method of sharing the waters of the Indus, and allocated the water from the eastern rivers [FN38] to India 
and those from the western rivers to Pakistan. [FN39] It also allowed India to utilize water from the *411 western 
rivers for some agricultural uses, and stipulated the storage capacities of the various reservoirs. [FN40] Under article 
VIII of the Treaty, the Permanent Indus Commission was constituted and each country established an office of the 
Commissioner for Indus Waters. [FN41] The Permanent Indus Commission is made up of these two commissioners 
and they are charged with the task of operationalizing the Treaty and facilitating cooperation. [FN42] Each 
Commissioner is the representative of his or her government for all matters arising out of the Treaty and are required 
to meet periodically. [FN43] Amazingly, over eighty-six such meetings have taken place between the two sides. 
[FN44] *412 The Commissioners have the opportunity to tour the rivers every five years. [FN45] The Treaty also 
requires them to host ad hoc tours of sites promptly in case of request by the Commissioner from the other country. 
[FN46] Apart from monitoring, these provisions serve as informational safeguards and go a long way in defusing 
tensions that stem largely from suspicion. By creating provisions that seek to enhance transparency, the Treaty limits 
prisoners' dilemma problems and serves to increase the likelihood of cooperative outcomes. Kraska writes that the 
agreement establishes constituencies 
 
        by broadening the numbers and types of participants throughout the basin, including governments and 
non-governmental organizations. The negotiations tend to include an array of scientific, technical, 
environmental, ecological, legal, administrative, economic, and military interests. The involvement of all of 
these interests has a progressive effect, helping to build an integrated approach to civil government and 
foreign relations. [FN47] 
       Perhaps crucial to the success of the Treaty has been the inclusion of detailed provisions pertaining to dispute 
resolution. In the first instance, “differences” are to be settled by the Commission by agreement. [FN48] In the event 
that this mechanism does not resolve the problem, the commissioners can individually refer the matter to a “neutral 
expert.” [FN49] The “neutral expert,” a highly qualified *413 engineer, is to be appointed by the World Bank during 
the transition period, and thereafter jointly by the two governments. [FN50] As per Annexure F, the neutral expert is 
competent to determine the amount of water that Pakistan is entitled to from the Ravi and the Sutlej; [FN51] the 
boundary basin for the Indus, Chenab, and the Jhelum; [FN52] whether or not any use of water or storage in addition 
to that provided in the Treaty is carried out by India on the Western Rivers; [FN53] questions relating to obligations 
with respect to, and maintenance of drains; [FN54] various questions pertaining to the appropriateness of water use; 
[FN55] questions pertaining to financial compensation upon the agreement of both commissioners; [FN56] and 
determination of costs. [FN57] 
 
       If the subject matter is not within article IX (2)(a), [FN58] or if the neutral expert believes that the difference is 
a “dispute,” then the treaty provides three options. First, the commission shall report the dispute to the two 
governments with the reasoned views of each commissioner. [FN59] Secondly, *414 upon receipt of this report, or 
after determining that the report has been unduly delayed, each government can try to settle the dispute by 
agreement with the help of a mediator. [FN60] Thirdly, the governments can arbitrate the dispute. [FN61] The 
decision of the neutral expert is binding on all parties and any arbitral tribunal established under the treaty. [FN62] 
 
       In the event that the “difference” becomes a “dispute,” either party can institute arbitration. [FN63] The court of 
arbitration is to be comprised of seven arbitrators: two appointed by each of the parties, and three umpires--a highly 
qualified engineer, an international law expert, and a person qualified to be the chairman of the court. [FN64] The 
annexure provides detailed provisions on the appointment process and requires the establishment of a standing panel 
*415 of arbitrators. [FN65] Each arbitrator is to have one vote, with the chairman having the deciding vote in the 
event of a tie. [FN66] 
 
       Article IX was the subject of difference resolved by the neutral expert in early 2007. In January 2005, upon the 
request of Pakistan, which objected to India's building of the Baglihar Dam on the Chenab River, a neutral expert 
had to be appointed under the Treaty. [FN67] Raymond Lafitte, a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Lausanne, was appointed by the World Bank to make a decision on the differences between the two 
governments.  [FN68] He declared his final verdict on February 12, 2007, partially upholding some objections of 
Pakistan while limiting some flow control capabilities of the dam design. However, he overruled Pakistani 
objections on height and gated control of the spillway, finding that these conformed to engineering specifications. 
 
       The Indus Treaty is high on obligation, high on precision, [FN69] and high on delegation. Under the Abbott-
Snidal model, this is an example of hard legalization. The Treaty has continued to survive despite the three wars that 
were fought between the two countries and has proved to be effective for the purpose for which it was adopted. One 
author writes that 
 
        [t]here was intense pressure from hardliners in India for New *416 Delhi to abrogate the Indus Waters 
Treaty, which would be seen by Pakistan as a threat to cut off water at some point in the future. Many in India 
went even further, arguing not only that the meeting should be skipped, but that India should abrogate the 
treaty altogether. Instead, India conducted the commission meetings because it wanted to “show the world 
that it is behaving responsibly. [FN70] 
       The second agreement that is the subject of analysis is the Rann of Kutch Agreement that was signed between 
the two nations in 1965. [FN71] This was the result of the threat of escalating military hostilities over a territorial 
dispute pertaining to the Rann of Kutch. [FN72] Under British coaxing, the two countries agreed to a cease-fire and 
to submit the dispute to arbitration.  [FN73] The terms of the agreement provided that the parties would undertake 
“to implement the findings of the tribunal in full as quickly as possible,” and that the tribunal should remain intact 
until its findings had been implemented. [FN74] The agreement allowed each party to nominate a member of the 
tribunal, with its chairman to *417 be appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. [FN75] After the 
Tribunal rendered its award, the parties jointly demarcated the boundary, and the Tribunal was dissolved on 
September 22, 1969. [FN76] The entire process was concluded in about four years, and it was marked by a spirit of 
cooperation. [FN77] Copeland writes that “[n]either side questioned the authority of the Tribunal, and both sides 
worked together to implement the decision,” and that one of the reasons for the success of the arbitration was that 
the issues were well defined. [FN78] This agreement, under the Abbott-Snidal model, would be an example of hard 
legalization with a high level of obligation, high level of precision, and high level of delegation. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that this is one of the most successful agreements between the two nations. It is also significant that the 
agreement was signed on the Pakistani side by a military leader rather than a politician, supporting arguments 
pertaining to correlation between regime and legalization, and the need to enlist the key compliance community--
here, the Pakistani army. 
 
       The third agreement for analysis is the Tashkent Declaration, signed by the two countries in the immediate 
aftermath of the second war between them in 1965.  [FN79] Under *418 the brokerage of the Soviet Union, Indian 
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the Pakistani President, Muhammad Ayub Khan, met for the Tashkent 
Conference from January 4th through the 10th, with the Soviet Premier, Kosygin, playing the role of a mediator and 
facilitating the signing of the document that met with some criticism in India. [FN80] Under this agreement, the two 
countries agree to make “all efforts to establish good relations . . . in accordance with the United Nations Charter” 
and “reaffirm their obligation . . . not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means.” 
[FN81] Both sides agreed to withdraw their troops to positions held prior to the commencement of the hostilities, 
and in a foreshadowing of the Simla Agreement, “agree[d] to follow the principle of non-interference in their 
affairs” [FN82] and “discourage the use of any propaganda against each other.” [FN83] The language of the 
declaration was mainly general and vague, containing such promises as one to take “measures towards the 
restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between the two 
countries.” [FN84] Some of the few provisions containing action pertained to the repatriation of *419 prisoners of 
war, [FN85] and the resuming of diplomatic relations. [FN86] 
 
       This agreement is medium to high on obligation (committing the parties to renounce violent methods to solve 
disputes), [FN87] low on precision (as it does not provide much content for the obligations and does not spell out the 
consequences of violation), and low-to-nonexistent on delegation. Under the Abbott-Snidal model it is an example 
of low legalization. It is hard to understand the reasons for the contrast between the Tashkent Agreement and the 
Rann of Kutch Agreement given that they are proximate in terms of time. The former is characterized by soft 
legalization (or no legalization) whereas the latter is an exemplar of successful hard legalization. One can only 
speculate whether this is because the parties did not intend that their obligations be binding or because they did not 
appreciate the effect of legalization on ensuring compliance. 
 
       The fourth accord of significance is the oft-quoted Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972. [FN88] It was signed by 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of 
the war between the two nations resulting in the creation of the new nation of Bangladesh. [FN89] The first 
paragraph of the agreement states that 
 
        [t]he Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end 
to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a 
friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so that both 
countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies *420 to the pressing task of advancing the 
welfare of their peoples. [FN90] In order to give effect to this hortative statement of intent, the two parties 
commit to applying “the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations” in their relations. 
[FN91] They also declare that they will “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral 
negotiations or by any other peaceful means” and that “both shall prevent the organization, assistance or 
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations . . . .” [FN92] 
Under the agreement the two countries recognized that “the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good 
neighborliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-
existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit . . . .” [FN93] They also agreed to “refrain from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.” [FN94] 
Recognizing the state of hysteria that existed on both sides of the border, the two governments committed to 
“take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries 
will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations 
between them.” [FN95] This is a key clause as it comes in the background of hysterical and one-sided media 
coverage in both countries and the tendency to demonize each other. With regard to immediate normalization 
of relations following the war, the agreement committed both sides to “resume communications, postal, 
telegraphic, sea, land including border posts, and air links including overflights, . . . to promote travel 
facilities . . . [to resume] trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields,” and to promote 
exchanges in science and culture. [FN96] 
        *421 With regard to de-escalating tensions along the border, both sides agreed to withdraw troops and maintain 
the cease-fire line as the border. [FN97] Both sides also committed to periodic meetings to ensure that the peace 
process continued. [FN98] The Simla Accord continues to have rhetorical value to this day and even 
pronouncements by militant Islamic groups based in Pakistan bear this out. [FN99] 
 
       An examination of the Simla Accord using the legalization lens reveals that it is medium or high on obligation: 
committing the states to peace to “prevent the organization, assistance of encouragement of any acts detrimental to 
the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations,” [FN100] and so forth. It is relatively low on precision 
because it does not stipulate in detail how these objectives are to be achieved, and the consequences of violation of 
the obligations assumed. It is low to non-existent on delegation as the agreement is silent on implementing agencies, 
enforcement, monitoring, and interpretation. Under the Abbott and Snidal model, the Simla Accord is an example of 
*422 low legalization. This may signal the fact that the parties did not intend to undertake serious obligations and 
saw the accord only as a stopgap. This could certainly be true in the case of Pakistan as it had suffered enormously 
in the 1971 war, having lost East Pakistan entirely, and having endured the ignominy of Indian forces deep into its 
territory in the west. Pakistan had clear incentives to avoid hard legalization as it would be negotiating from an 
inferior bargaining position and would not want to undertake obligations that it would find hard to get out of. Given 
the shrewdness of Zulfikar Bhutto, this conclusion is inescapable. It remains something of a mystery as to why India 
gave up the enormous bargaining advantage that it possessed by virtue of its victory in the 1971 war to embody the 
accord in a legally binding agreement that was structured as an exemplar of hard legalization. Given the precarious 
nature of democracy in Pakistan, it should have had every reason to reduce the agreement to hard legalization in 
order to have the assurance that the Pakistani army would consider it binding. If the obligations enshrined in the 
Simla Agreement had been supported by high levels of precision and delegation, the chances of its success would 
have been significantly enhanced. In contrast to the Rann of Kutch Agreement, which was hard legalization, the 
Simla Accord is regarded as a failure insofar as it has failed to resolve the differences between the parties, although 
it is no small fact that there has been no full-scale war since its conclusion. [FN101] It may also be a limited success 
in terms of establishing bilateralism as the dominant approach to solving disputes between the states. 
 
       In 1988, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement to prohibit the attacking of each other's nuclear 
installations. [FN102] According to the agreement, “[e]ach party *423 shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging 
or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear 
installation or facility in the other country.” [FN103] For the purposes of the agreement, it appears that no 
distinction was made between civilian and military nuclear facilities. The operative term states that nuclear 
installation or facility “includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes 
separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and 
materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials.” [FN104] The 
agreement requires each side to notify the other about the precise locations of their respective nuclear facilities. 
[FN105] The agreement is high on obligation, reasonably high on precision, and low on delegation. It appears to be 
couched in the language of hard legalization and compliance is difficult to measure in the absence of a full-blown 
war following the agreement. 
 
       In 1992, India and Pakistan entered into an agreement that provided for “the complete prohibition of chemical 
weapons.” [FN106] The agreement included a commitment to *424 abjure from developing, possessing or using 
chemical weapons, as well as to refrain from assisting, encouraging or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in the 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. [FN107] At the time of the signing of 
the agreement, both parties declared that they did not possess stockpiles of chemical weapons. This agreement is 
high on obligation, low on precision, and low on delegation. 
 
       The political climate on the Indian side was unpredictably altered by the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) in March 1998. Given its pre-election bluster and historical antipathy towards Muslims, the BJP was expected 
to be tough on Pakistan. Early indications were that war would be a distinct possibility. Within months of assuming 
office, the government conducted four nuclear tests in 1998. [FN108] The international community was taken by 
surprise and it was assumed that Pakistan would have to respond. Tit-for-tat tests followed shortly thereafter. 
Sanctions were imposed on both countries. Faced with the horrors of a nuclear war in one of the most populous 
regions of the world, international attention was finally turned on getting the two countries to resume dialogue. In 
February 1999, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee resolved to 
negotiate, and in a highly symbolic move Mr. Vajpayee traveled to Lahore by bus. The two sides issued a joint 
communiqué, known as the Lahore Declaration. [FN109] The agreement kindled *425 hopes of a final resolution to 
the vexed Kashmir issue and there was much optimism that a breakthrough was imminent. Under the agreement, 
each side 
 
        shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; shall refrain 
from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs; shall intensify their composite and 
integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda; shall take 
immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss 
concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear and 
conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict; reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of 
SAARC and to concert their efforts towards the realisation of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and 
beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life 
through accelerated economic growth, social progress and cultural development; reaffirm their condemnation 
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to combat this menace; shall promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. [FN110] 
       Clearly, the Lahore Declaration contains some lofty objectives, but the language is worded in such generalities 
*426 that it is impossible to enforce. Under the Abbott-Snidal model it would be high on obligation, low on 
precision, and low-to-non-existent on delegation. Although the agreement frequently uses the word “shall,” the 
absence of any content and precision, coupled with the complete absence of enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms militates against it being much of an agreement. This was destined to be its downfall. Just a few months 
later, Pakistani-backed insurgents, under the charge of the military establishment, without apparent political backing, 
launched a campaign in Indian Kashmir requiring military action by India to evict them. When matters seemed to be 
escalating with the possibility of Indian reprisals beyond Kargil, President Clinton pressured the Pakistani Prime 
Minister to withdraw. The military establishment appeared to be beyond the control of the elected representatives 
and the humiliating withdrawal from Kargil culminated in a coup orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf. 
 
       Considered to be the architect of the military actions in Kargil, Mr. Musharaff was regarded with distaste in 
India and the peace process regressed. When it became apparent that Mr. Musharaff was here to stay, India 
reassessed its stance towards the military regime and invited him for a summit in Agra. There was a renewed 
expectation that this summit would be a furtherance of the thaw that had been initiated by the Lahore Declaration, 
but it ended in recriminations and the Indian side felt that they had been used by a canny Mr. Musharaff to bolster 
his credibility in Pakistan and to grandstand on the global stage. There are no published drafts of the agreement or 
credible explanations for the failed negotiations and it is hard to pin blame precisely. According to some, “Pakistan's 
insistence on the ‘settlement’ of the Jammu & Kashmir issue, as a pre-condition for the normalisation of relations” 
was the breaking point. [FN111] 
 
        *427 In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, Kashmiri separatists attacked 
the state legislature in Srinagar in Indian Kashmir killing thirty-eight people. Perhaps emboldened by this, militants 
associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba assaulted the Indian Parliament and killed fourteen people on December 13th. India 
alleged that Pakistan was responsible for both attacks and there was talk in India of bombing terrorist camps in 
Pakistan. Alarmed at the prospect of war and its impact on its operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. induced both sides 
to return to the negotiating table. India agreed to stop its military deployment along the border, and Pakistan pledged 
to destroy terrorist camps inside its territory. As far as this author is aware, these agreements have not been reduced 
to writing and there does not appear to be any mechanism to ensure compliance. The Congress Party's return to 
power in 2004 has not had much of an impact on the peace process and negotiations are in limbo. 
 
       2. Impact of Legalization. The history of negotiations between the two countries reveals the pervasive lack of 
trust. [FN112] This reveals several opportunities for legalization to work. The twin attributes of precision and 
delegation can reduce distrust by providing relevant information ex ante and a mechanism for verification ex post. 
Precision minimizes the potential for opportunistic interpretations and increases the cost of such conduct. Delegation 
minimizes the need for reliance on the other party's integrity alone by vesting monitoring and enforcement in a third 
party. The salutary effect of this can be seen in the *428 workings of the Indus Waters Treaty, most recently in the 
Baglihar dispute. When India informed Pakistan of its intention to construct a dam in Baglihar, it was met 
immediately with objections that reached a crescendo when the project was commenced in 1999. Despite the two 
countries being in a heightened state of military deployment since 1998, the existence of the Indus Waters Treaty, 
and its highly legalized scheme prevented the dispute from being a part of the cocktail of reasons for going to war. 
The existence of a mechanism for resolving the dispute meant that it did not have to be added to the list of 
irresolvable disputes. Had the treaty not been high on all three attributes of legalization--say, if it had been low on 
delegation--the parties would have to have added it to their fight. Legalization created a separation of the dam 
dispute from the other cankers and allowed the parties to debate it within the processual framework of the treaty. 
The existence of the Indus River Commission presented the first forum for dispute resolution and indeed, this was 
where the parties negotiated for over three years. When Pakistan was on the verge of requesting the World Bank to 
appoint a neutral expert under the treaty in 2003, India responded with an offer for bilateral negotiations that kept 
the parties within a processual framework for another two years. When the neutral expert was finally appointed in 
2005, it committed the parties to provisions of the treaty to await a determination by the neutral expert. Without the 
pressure valve being released at various junctures by the treaty's process, the “difference” between the two countries 
could possibly have escalated into another dispute that created more distrust and hardened positions. 
 
       3. Participation from Key Actors. Every agreement is only applicable to the parties that are signatories to it. If 
the agreement leaves out key actors, the fact that it exhibits all the dimensions of hard legalization will have very 
little effect. The Indus Waters Treaty's success is in no small measure because of its success in co-opting the key 
constituencies--the political actors, engineers, and the World Bank. By making all three sections a key part of the 
working of the treaty, it minimizes the opportunity for dissonance. Legalization is particularly well-suited to 
increasing the range of actors that can be co-opted because of its salutary effect on the flow of information. This 
becomes even more pertinent in polities that are *429 characterized by a high degree of centralization like Pakistan. 
The nitty-gritty of agreements that are low on legalization is typically known only to a handful of elite political 
actors. While actors that are hostile to the agreement are likely to be well mobilized, regardless of the details, the 
informational offshoots of a process of hard legalization have the potential to facilitate the mobilization of actors 
that are favorably inclined to the agreement. Such actors include peace activists, political parties, religious 
organizations, businesses, and even the legal community. [FN113] Political parties have not had much success 
historically in Pakistan's foreign policy debates. It is likely that legalization, at best, provides them with information 
that can be used to lobby more powerful constituencies like the intelligence services, religious leaders, and the army. 
[FN114] In the Indian context, legalization serves to build consensus and buy-ins from fractious political parties 
which frequently act as if they have no long-term policies apart from one-upmanship. Legalization's institutional 
processes offer venues to air opinions freely, and the level of dissonance can serve to signal India's level of 
commitment to the agreement, and the potential risks with regard to compliance depending upon the party in power. 
Hard legalization can also be useful in countries like India because of the range of political ideologies on view. 
India's Parliament has representation from the communists, the socialists, Hindu-nationalists, Muslim League, 
various regionalists, casteists, and moderates. Various coalitions have been in power in recent years and legalization 
can serve to constrain Parliament in case it is more war-prone than the executive branch and vice-versa. 
 
       4. Lessons from the India-Pakistan Experience. The *430 foregoing analysis appears to show that legalized 
agreements have had a higher degree of success than non-legalized ones. The three agreements that have been 
successful (Rann of Kutch, Indus Waters, Chemical Weapons) all exhibit hard legalization under the Abbott-Snidal 
framework. Future work on agreement design would benefit from legalized agreements that exhibit high levels of 
obligation, precision, and delegation. The evidence of conduct between India and Pakistan also shows that what 
Abbott and Snidal would characterize as soft legalization is not regarded either as law or as a constraining influence 
by both states. Military action has not been prevented by the Simla and Lahore Agreements, and both sides disregard 
them with impunity when it suits them. This is in distinct contrast to those agreements that are characterized by hard 
legalization being observed as legal and binding, despite the onset of military conflict. The conclusion seems 
powerful that India and Pakistan do not place much value in non-legal agreements in terms of compliance and do not 
believe that they are bound by obligations contained in such agreements. 
 
       The functionalist argument that soft law is advantageous because of lower contracting costs--by which is meant 
the expenditure in terms of drafting time, negotiation, ratification, etc.--may have to be modified in the context of 
high-conflict states. Abbott and Snidal argue that hard legalization is more costly because states are more careful in 
“negotiating and drafting legal agreements, since the costs of violation are higher.” [FN115] The argument with 
regard to hard law being more costly than soft law is only true on one front--ratification. All the other costs are 
incurred in the case of “soft law” too. Experts will still be consulted; differences between competing interests must 
still be resolved; negotiation is still just as contentious--as proponents of various interests argue just as vigorously--
exemplified so powerfully in the Agra summit discussed hereinbefore. A modified functionalist thesis is presented 
by Raustiala who argues that the risk of opportunistic conduct *431 may be the causal variable that “suggests that 
pledges will be observed only when the risk of opportunism is low and uncertainty high.” [FN116] In the case of 
high-conflict states the trust deficit creates conducive conditions for opportunistic conduct and suggests that hard 
legalization may be preferable. 
 
       Hard legalization would also appear to be supported on the basis of liberal theory which suggests that credibility 
is factored into the choice of soft law versus hard law. Aliter, when credibility is dependant on legislative approval, 
states are more likely to prefer hard law unless the state possesses other mechanisms to ensure and enhance 
credibility. [FN117] Raustiala writes that in “more technocratic and arcane areas, the available empirical evidence 
suggests that the prevalence of pledges roughly, if inconsistently, rises as uncertainty rises--as functional theory 
predicts.” [FN118] He provides examples to support both the functionalist claim that uncertainty influences the form 
of international agreement and the liberal claim that pledges are “most common in areas of low domestic salience.” 
[FN119] Given that Pakistan is not a democratic society and is subject to capricious regime change, it would be in 
India's interest to enhance the credibility of Pakistan's commitments by insisting on hard legalization. This would 
ensure that it has the ability to read signals conveyed by the key constituencies as a result of the debate stirred up by 
the high levels of obligation, precision, and delegation so as to hone its own negotiating strategy after gauging 
seriousness on the other side, and to ensure that successor governments do not have the ability to unravel soft law 
commitments on the plea that they are not binding. 
 
       Insisting on hard legalization will also focus attention on obligation--a dimension of legalization that the 
Abbott-Snidal thesis does not elaborate upon. Their theory would not suggest an answer to the question as to 
whether obligations can be legitimately entered into by a military *432 dictator who seizes power in a coup. If the 
answer is in the negative, hard legalization will not help India very much as long as President Musharaff leads 
Pakistan. It may be possible to mitigate the democratic deficit by other processes that legalization triggers--for 
example, parliamentary deliberation and debate--to the extent that Pakistan's current constitutional structure allows 
it. In any event, hard legalization is preferable even on this view because it has informational advantages over non-
legalization or soft legalization, as there is no room for participation by parties other than the nominees of the 
illegitimate power holder, and there is no way in which the other side can gauge the reaction of the legitimate 
players. 
 
B. Darfur 
 
       Darfur, a region in the western part of Sudan, is home to about 6 million people. [FN120] The root of the 
conflict in Darfur appears to be the creation of two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which took form in 2001 and 2002 in opposition to the government 
in Khartoum. While initially content to stage attacks on government facilities, the weak-kneed response from 
Khartoum apparently emboldened the rebels into launching more daring raids on military targets. [FN121] In an 
apparent reaction to these attacks and the fact that its military included significant numbers of Darfuris who were 
reluctant to take arms against their own brethren, the Khartoum regime seems to have struck upon the devious ploy 
of creating an army of the willing to fight the rebels.  [FN122] Calculated to benefit from historical divisions among 
the tribes, this resulted in the creation of the “Janjaweed,” meaning “armed bandit or outlaw on a horse or camel,” 
essentially *433 tribesmen who had enlisted to kill Darfuris. [FN123] The violence appears to be directed at the non-
Arab population although they share a common religion, Islam, with the Arab population of Sudan. [FN124] While 
the precise source for the ethnic hatred is unclear, it has been suggested that the tensions are owed to the scarcity of 
land and grazing rights. [FN125] 
 
       So began the world's “greatest humanitarian crisis.” [FN126] In the words of the U.N. Humanitarian 
Coordinator for Sudan, Mukesh Kapila: “‘The only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers 
involved . . . . [This] is more than just a conflict, it is an organized attempt to do away with a group of people.”’ 
Heralding the terrible carnage that was to follow, he said: “‘[T]he pattern of organised attacks on civilians and 
villages, abductions, killings and organised rapes by militias was getting worse by the day . . . and could deteriorate 
even further. One can see how the situation might develop without prompt [action] . . . all the warning signs are 
there.”’ [FN127] The United Nations is struggling to cope with the sheer scale of the tragedy: approximately two 
million people in camps in Darfur and another 200,000 people inside Chad along the Darfur border. [FN128] There 
are hundreds of thousands of *434 persons who are unaccounted for--it is unknown whether they are dead, hiding, 
staying with relatives or friends, or not on the books of the United Nations. [FN129] The Coalition for International 
Justice (CIJ), the organization appointed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (US AID) found that more than 200,000 people have died in the violence in Darfur, a figure that 
obviously undercounts significantly. [FN130] Most Darfuris believe that about 90 percent of all African villages 
have now been destroyed. 
 
       Despite the nature of the killings and the length of time it has been going on, the international community has 
shown a marked reluctance to call it genocide. The reluctance starts with the United Nations. On July 30, 2004, the 
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, [FN131] *435 calling upon Khartoum to fulfill commitments it 
made to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates. 
[FN132] The Security Council resolution also called on Khartoum to allow humanitarian access to Darfur. [FN133] 
It placed an embargo on the sale or supply of material and training to non-governmental entities and individuals in 
Darfur. [FN134] The resolution endorsed the African Union deployment of monitors and a protection force to 
Darfur. [FN135] It requested the Secretary-General to report on Khartoum progress in 30 days and held out the 
possibility of further actions, including sanctions, against Khartoum in the event of non-compliance. [FN136] The 
U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on Darfur issued in January 2005 was of the opinion that there was 
“insufficient evidence of genocidal intent” on the part of the NIF. [FN137] The COI Report notes that “[h]undreds 
of incidents have been reported involving the killing of civilians, massacres, summary executions, rape and other 
forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction and 
torching of villages.” [FN138] It did find evidence of state complicity and involvement in the killings, however, and 
asked for all violations of international law in Darfur to be referred to the International Criminal Court *436 (ICC). 
[FN139] This was accepted by the U.N. Security Council, which passed a resolution on March 31. [FN140] The 
COI Report concluded that there was no “specific intent” necessary for “genocide.” [FN141] A European Union 
report found that there was “widespread, silent and slow killing going on, and village burning on a fairly large 
scale,” yet refused to call it genocide. [FN142] 
 
       The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in May 2006, between the Government of the Sudan (GoS) and 
the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)--Minawi faction, in Abuja, Nigeria. [FN143] The agreement was 
the result of intense negotiations and appeared to be on the verge of collapse at various times with a breakthrough 
being achieved only due to sustained pressure from the U.S. and other interested parties. [FN144] Despite this, the 
SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have refused 
to sign the *437 agreement. [FN145] Abdel Wahid's discontent with the DPA pertains to the lack of more direct 
SLA participation in the implementation of security arrangements, provisions for political representation, and a 
victim's compensation fund. [FN146] The JEM's grievances are that the agreement does not address the political 
imbalances that were the source of the conflict. When faced with the prospect of two years of negotiations being 
futile, the African Union's mediators tried to end the stalemate by allowing separate bilateral power-sharing talks 
between the government and Abdel Wahid's faction. With the familiar old ploy of divide and conquer, the 
government hoped that the fear of being marginalized would lead the faction to sign up, but Abdel Wahid got cold 
feet at the last moment. [FN147] 
 
       The DPA, in its preamble, states that the parties “condemning all acts of violence against civilians and 
violations of human rights, and stressing full and unconditional acceptance of their obligations under International 
Humanitarian Law, international human rights law, and relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions” resolved to 
enter into the agreement to “be a significant step towards a just, peaceful and lasting political solution to the conflict 
in Darfur.” [FN148] In its chapter on General Principles for Power Sharing, the DPA provides for citizenship as the 
basis for civil and political rights and *438 obligations, [FN149] for the peaceful devolution of power through 
democratic means, [FN150] separation of powers, [FN151] rule of law, [FN152] free and fair elections, [FN153] a 
federal system of government, [FN154] the creation of a constitutional court, [FN155] and greater representation for 
women. [FN156] 
        Recognizing that the violence has its roots in the disenchantment of the Darfuris, the DPA states that 
“[a]ffirmative action shall be taken in favor of Darfurians in order to enhance inclusivity in public services.” 
[FN157] Despite the fact that the perceived sense of injustice felt by the Darfuris was the source of the conflict, this 
provision is high on obligation, low on precision, and has no delegation attribute under the legalization framework. 
It is unclear as to how affirmative action policies will be crafted, at what levels, to what extent, and what remedy 
exists for claims by private individuals. 
 
       The agreement provides protections against illegal arrest and detention, [FN158] a presumption of innocent 
until proven guilty, [FN159] right to be informed of reasons for arrest, [FN160] right to legal representation, 
[FN161] right to legal aid if the person cannot afford a lawyer, [FN162] fair trial, [FN163] and *439 attainder. 
[FN164] The DPA also provides for the right to life and liberty, [FN165] freedom from torture, [FN166] freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishment, [FN167] a right to privacy, [FN168] right to vote in elections, [FN169] right to 
acquire property, [FN170] right to freedom of religion, [FN171] and freedom of speech and expression. [FN172] 
While these human rights look impressive on paper, and are high on obligation and precision, it is unclear as to what 
sort of delegation is contemplated. There is no provision that expressly guarantees a right to access the courts to 
make a claim for violation of any of these rights. As far as this author can tell, there is no provision granting special 
jurisdiction to a court to hear matters pertaining to these rights in a manner that is different from ordinary claims 
under other statutes. It is also unclear as to what kinds of remedies any court that is seized of matters relating to 
these rights can grant. The DPA does not seem to make any judgments by courts under these rights binding on the 
government. The only provision that gives any guidance is paragraph 41: “There shall be no derogation of the above 
rights and freedoms except as provided for in the Constitution [into which this Agreement shall be incorporated]. 
The Human Rights Commission provided for in the INC, which shall enjoy full independence, shall monitor the 
application of the rights and freedoms provided for herein.” [FN173] 
 
       In order to facilitate the establishment of a federal structure and separation of powers, the DPA establishes a 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) for the *440 interim period. [FN174] It is to have widespread 
authority for “facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, coordinating the restoration of 
security, and promoting peace and reconciliation throughout Darfur.” [FN175] The permanent status of Darfur is to 
be determined by a referendum within twelve months after the elections in Darfur and no later than 2010. [FN176] 
Paragraph 57 provides two options for determination by the referendum: “(a) The creation of a Darfur Region 
composed of the three states; (b) Retention of the status quo of three states.” [FN177] The DPA provides 
representation at the senior level to members of the SLM and the JEM including: one senior assistant to the 
president, one cabinet minister in addition to the existing three, and two state ministers in addition to the existing 
three; [FN178] the chairmanship of one Parliamentary Committee; [FN179] as well as twelve National Assembly 
seats; [FN180] and one commission chairmanship. These provisions are high on obligation, precision, and 
delegation. The last attribute is particularly important for the conduct of the referendum and the express provision 
for international monitors is a welcome sign. [FN181] The DPA also provides for increased representation of 
Darfuris in the judiciary, [FN182] the *441 civil service, [FN183] national organizations and institutions, [FN184] 
the armed services, [FN185] and educational institutions. [FN186] Educational opportunities for Darfuris were to be 
addressed on a priority basis with interim measures. [FN187] The preceding provisions are high on obligation and 
medium on precision, but very low on delegation. Yet, at their core, these provisions are most likely to continue the 
feeling of disenfranchisement amongst the average Darfuri, and a higher level of delegation would have been 
preferable. The Senior Assistant to the President will also be Chairperson of the TDRA, is to be appointed by the 
President, and will be the fourth highest ranking member of the government. [FN188] The Senior Assistant, apart 
from being responsible for the implementation of the agreement, also has several other powers, including 
appointments. [FN189] This provision is high on all three attributes of legalization. With regard to the *442 
demarcation of the border, the DPA requires the parties to retreat to pre-January 1, 1956 positions, and creates a 
technical ad hoc team to monitor compliance--obligation, precision, and delegation in action. [FN190] 
 
       The DPA's security provisions are contained in Chapter III. Paragraph 214 commits the parties to “[u]ndertake 
to refrain from acts such as mobilization, recruitment or initiatives that are likely to jeopardize the peace process 
including offensive military actions, movements, deployment of forces and engaging in hostile propaganda 
campaigns as a reaffirmation of commitment to create and maintain a conducive atmosphere.” [FN191] Importantly, 
it requires the parties to “[u]ndertake measures to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed/armed militias in line with 
U.N. resolutions 1556 and 1564 . . . .” [FN192] The DPA is rather weak on enforcement [FN193] of this 
undertaking, content to requiring the parties to “[p]ut in place proper mechanisms for the demobilization, 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of former combatants returning to civilian life.” [FN194] The DPA does, 
however, list a slew of “prohibited activities” in order to strengthen the ceasefire and promote peace. [FN195] It also 
*443 charges the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with responsibility for monitoring and verification of 
compliance. [FN196] AMIS's responsibilities include inspection and certification of assembly areas for rebel 
fighters; [FN197] establishment and enforcement of buffer zones [FN198] from which the parties are excluded 
around IDP camps and main humanitarian corridors; [FN199] building community policing mechanisms; [FN200] 
establishing separate police counters for reporting crimes committed against women; [FN201] establishment of a 
plan for nomadic migration; [FN202] and separation of the parties' areas of control. A Ceasefire Commission is to 
be established under the chairmanship of the AMIS commander, [FN203] with the E.U. and the U.S. as observers. 
[FN204] The DPA recognizes the utility of non-legal sanctions like naming and shaming in two places in connection 
with the monitoring of ceasefire: Paragraph 247, and Paragraph 250, which mandates the Joint Commission to “take 
decisive action in relation to ceasefire violations . . . [by] [p]ublicising the violation and the name of the Party *444 
that committed the violation.” [FN205] This is in addition to prosecution and other procedures. [FN206] The DPA 
contemplates securing compliance by non-parties to the agreement through “non-military means.” [FN207] 
 
       The agreement is rather broad on what constitutes breach: Paragraph 299 provides that “[a]ny breach of the 
rules relating to the disengagement, redeployment and limited arms control processes presented in this Chapter shall 
be a violation of the ceasefire.” [FN208] With regard to disarming the Janjaweed the DPA seems to leave the entire 
responsibility to the GoS. [FN209] It asks the government to neutralize the Janjaweed, and provides some guidance 
as to how this is to be done. [FN210] It allows the GoS to undertake “[e]nforcement operations in selected localities 
with the intent of apprehending and disarming,” to “[c]onfiscat[e] . . . heavy and long-range weapons systems, crew-
operated weapons and motor vehicles,” to prosecute and punish criminals, and to take any other actions contained in 
the *445 plan with the consent of the Ceasefire Commission. [FN211] In an attempt to aid verification, the DPA 
empowers the AMIS to inspect locations where the parties are required to hold their weapons. [FN212] The DPA 
also assigns responsibility for policing to the GoS and AMIS, depending on who controls the zones. [FN213] The 
preceding security provisions are high on obligation and precision, but medium on delegation because the AMIS is 
not assigned any capacity to do anything in the event of breach. Without a strong pro-active and offensive 
capability, the delegation function is rather useless in a security context. 
 
       Realizing that no amount of military planning will provide a conclusive solution, the DPA contains provisions 
pertaining to the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants. It requires the creation of a Reintegration 
Plan [FN214] and the convening of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC), which is intended to be a 
meeting of all the relevant stakeholders. [FN215] The objective of this conference is to address the political causes 
for the conflict and to find a way to bring about a lasting peace, *446 firstly by publicizing the DPA. [FN216] This 
lofty objective is somewhat tainted by the fact that the DDDC is merely an “advisory and facilitation mechanism,” 
and is only given the power to “make recommendations and observations to the national and Darfur authorities, 
including community leaders.” [FN217] These provisions exhibit high levels of obligation, but low levels of 
precision and delegation. 
 
       In the event that there is disagreement concerning the interpretation of the DPA, paragraph 508 provides that 
“[t]he Parties agree to settle any disagreement or dispute arising under this Agreement by peaceful means. The 
Parties further agree that in the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement, 
they shall refer the matter to the A.U. Commission.” [FN218] This is a key provision and a higher level of 
delegation would have seen a provision like that in the Indus Waters Treaty providing for binding arbitration, 
perhaps under the aegis of the African Union. By stopping short of such a provision, the DPA runs the risk of being 
violated with impunity, as the parties know that there is no enforcement machinery and consequent sanction for 
breach. The DPA also provides an innovative feature to ensure that the agreement does not remain purely on paper: 
an independent Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission (DAEC), with the objective of promoting “the full 
and timely implementation” of the agreement. [FN219] The DAEC is to be comprised of three representatives from 
the GoS including the advisor to the President on matters relating to Darfur, three representatives from the SLM/A 
and the JEM, one designated representative from the African Union, five representatives from the observer states 
and organizations, and a maximum of three additional representatives from such other states, or regional or 
international bodies, as shall be agreed by the Parties. [FN220] *447 The DEAC is charged with the responsibility to 
monitor implementation of the agreement on an ongoing basis, to assess difficulties and redress them, to “consult 
and coordinate” with other relevant agencies, maintain close ties with the Parties to facilitate their full compliance, 
and to liaise with other regional and international organizations. [FN221] 
 
       On the economic front, one of the most contentious wealth sharing provisions in the DPA is related to 
“compensation.” Article 10 of the Declaration of Principles, agreed by the parties on July 6, 2005, states: “Steps 
shall be taken to compensate the people of Darfur and address grievances for lives lost, assets destroyed or stolen, 
and suffering caused.” [FN222] The main sticking point appeared to be the distinction between reconstruction 
funding and compensation for individual losses; the government's position was that reconstruction funding was 
compensation, while the separatists wanted that to be separate. [FN223] As part of the economic package, the DPA 
set up the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to allow persons affected by the conflict to rebuild their 
lives. The fund requires commitments from the government to provide $300 million at start up and $200 million in 
2007. Given the enormity of the financial needs and the limited resources possessed by Khartoum, a donors 
conference is to be convened by the international community. 
 
       In the immediate aftermath of the DPA, there were worries that the Janjaweed would act as spoilers. These 
worries came true on May 8th, with Janjaweed militia attacking villages near Buram, in South Darfur. A week 
thereafter, on May 15th, the Janjaweed killed eleven civilians in attacks against villages around Kutum, North 
Darfur, and burned villages around Donkey Dereisa, south of Nyala in South Darfur. A couple of days later, the 
Janjaweed fired at an A.U. patrol.  The U.N. and the A.U. held the Janjaweed responsible for the deaths of at least 
60 people during that week alone.  There were also claims from *448 the SLA/MM faction that the government was 
acting in breach of the agreement by attacking its positions at Dar es-Salaam in North Darfur on May 21st in concert 
with the Janjaweed. Concerned with the claims, counterclaims, and the rising death toll, the U.N. Security Council 
declared an intention to impose sanctions against those who “violate[] or attempt[] to block the implementation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement . . . .” [FN224] 
 
       Analysis of the DPA shows that the main weaknesses pertain to the third limb of the legalization troika--
delegation. There is a marked reluctance by the parties to assume accountability and this is a debilitating flaw for an 
agreement that is so rich in detail. The difficult process of achieving agreement on so many details runs the serious 
risk of being undone because of a weak delegation thread that runs through the paragraphs. Coevally, no agreement, 
regardless of the extent of legalization, can succeed unless all the relevant parties are signatories. In the immediate 
analysis, it is this fact that has contributed to the DPA's failure rather than any of the missing attributes of 
legalization. 
 
C. Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement 
 
       The agreement was signed in 1979 by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin under the active 
encouragement of President Carter in Washington, D.C. The preamble recites that the parties are “[c]onvinced of the 
urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East . . . .” [FN225] 
They agreed to terminate the war between them, and Israel agreed to withdraw its troops and civilians from the Sinai 
behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, allowing Egypt to exercise sovereign 
power over the Sinai. [FN226] The parties agreed to establish their permanent boundary in accordance with an 
agreed-to map, *449 leaving aside the position of the Gaza Strip. [FN227] Both sides agreed to respect the 
inviolability of each other's territorial sovereignty. [FN228] The parties emphasized the applicability of the UN 
Charter and other principles of international law and committed to resolve disputes between them in a peaceful 
manner. [FN229] Given the familiar accusations of proxy wars, article III, paragraph 2 commits the parties to 
 
        ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not 
committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on 
its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to 
refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, 
hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators 
of such acts are brought to justice. [FN230] The preceding provisions are high on obligation, low to medium 
on precision, and non-existent on delegation. 
       Recognizing that distrust can undermine the agreement, the two sides agreed to the stationing of United Nations 
personnel in agreed-upon areas with the understanding that neither party was to request their withdrawal. [FN231] 
Under the agreement, these personnel were *450 not to be removed unless the removal was to be approved by the 
U.N. Security Council. [FN232] This provided the delegation element, at least in relation to the high obligation to 
ensure that there are no acts of military aggression. Given that this was the most important obligation under the 
agreement, it was perhaps sufficient to provide for delegation with regard to that obligation. 
 
       In order to promote trust and facilitate implementation, the agreement also provided for the creation of a joint 
commission. [FN233] This commission is to meet at least once every month and is responsible for coordination, 
problem resolution, assisting the U.N. forces, organizing the demarcation of the international boundary, supervising 
the handover of installations in the Sinai to Egypt, making arrangements for the return of the bodies of fallen 
soldiers, organizing the setting up of entry points and their operation, and the discussion of other matters placed 
before it by the parties. [FN234] This joint commission is an example of medium delegation--while it provides for 
some precise responsibilities, the absence of any teeth means that it cannot be considered an exemplar of high 
delegation. 
 
       A slightly higher example of hard legalization (in its delegation aspect) is the conferment of responsibility upon 
the United States to conduct aerial surveillance during the withdrawal operations. [FN235] This immediately 
provides a neutral verification and enforcement machinery and strengthens the relevant obligations. 
 
       The trust issue surfaces again in article VI when the parties are obligated to fulfill their obligations under the 
treaty in good faith, an extremely important provision given the fact that the principle of good faith comes with a 
certain circumjacence of legal principles that can be enforced. [FN236] The parties are also required to abjure from 
entering into *451 other treaty obligations that may run counter to this agreement. [FN237] Article V gave Israeli 
ships and cargoes destined for Israel the right of unimpeded passage through the Suez Canal in a non-discriminatory 
manner. [FN238] These provisions are high on obligation, but are low on precision and delegation. 
 
       No treaty is free from interpretative difficulties, and if it does not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes, it 
runs the risk of being overtaken by events. The agreement recognizes this and provides a two-fold dispute resolution 
mechanism. In the first instance, disputes are to be resolved by negotiations. [FN239] If that fails, the parties are to 
attempt to resolve their disputes by conciliation or by submitting them to arbitration. [FN240] With regard to 
financial claims, a claims commission is to be established.  [FN241] These provisions exhibit marked contrasts to 
the Simla Agreement and the DPA, and it is no surprise that there has been a higher degree of success here with the 
agreement being high on delegation. 
 
       The protocol attached to the Treaty fleshes out some of the commitments. It provides a time frame of three years 
from the date of the agreement for Israel to complete the withdrawal of its forces, with interim withdrawal to be 
completed in nine months. [FN242] Recognizing the complexity of *452 the withdrawal process and the potential 
for miscommunication and possible recriminations, the protocol provides for the creation of a joint commission 
[FN243] to supervise and coordinate the withdrawal. [FN244] After the completion of the work of the joint 
commission and its dissolution, “a liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the 
implementation of obligations . . . [and] to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of 
either Party.” [FN245] *453 The protocol also establishes a detailed aerial and naval military regime that divides up 
the area into zones and delineates allowed activity by both sides to their respective zones. [FN246] This protocol 
exhibits high obligation, precision, and delegation, and once again demonstrates the virtues of legalization in the 
context of high-conflict states where trust is at a premium. 
 
       To be sure, no international dispute can be resolved purely by military solutions. Economic and political 
initiatives are just as necessary if a lasting peace is to be achieved. The Israel-Egypt Agreement recognizes that fact 
and in Annex III, a protocol concerning relations of the parties was signed. Under this protocol, both sides agreed to 
establish diplomatic relations after the completion of the interim withdrawal. [FN247] The parties agreed to remove 
discriminatory trade barriers and committed to commencing negotiations within six months toward concluding a 
trade and commerce agreement. [FN248] The protocol also obligated the parties to promote cultural exchanges, 
[FN249] allow the movement of people across borders, [FN250] allow access to religious sites, [FN251] negotiate a 
civil aviation agreement, [FN252] and normal postal and communications links. [FN253] Article 5 of Annex III 
contains a statement of intent to foster good neighborly relations, to abstain from hostile propaganda against each 
other, and to recognize that there is a “mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations.” [FN254] These 
provisions, as is probably to be expected of such commitments, are high on obligation but low on precision and 
delegation. 
 
       There is no doubt that the agreement is a success. As recently as 2004, Israel and Egypt concluded a historic 
*454 trade agreement with the U.S. [FN255] This might not have been possible but for the peace agreement in 1979. 
It is certainly true that President Sadat paid a terrible price for his courage. [FN256] 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
       There is a marked distinction on the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation between agreements 
that are successful and those that are not. Given the close proximity of some of the events that have given rise to 
both kinds of agreements, it is hard to escape the conclusion that there is a correlation between hard legalization, on 
all its dimensions, and the success of agreements between high- conflict states. This is owed primarily to the trust 
deficit that exists between these states and the potential for highly legalized agreements to apportion the costs of 
breach ex ante. The rationale is similar to that advanced for the need for long and detailed contracts between parties 
who either have no history of successful contracting, or who have a history of conflict and disagreement. While non-
contract agreements might work perfectly adequately between parties operating within the embrace of trust, strong 
contract language is almost always preferable for parties operating under the shadow of suspicion. In the context of 
high conflict of states, the empirical analysis reveals that the existence of a third-party guarantor almost always has a 
positive correlation to success. The Indus Waters Treaty and the Israel-Egypt Treaty are both exemplars of this 
feature. States characterized by ethno-religious conflicts should embrace lessons from this fact and aim to structure 
agreements such that they are high on obligation, precision, *455 and delegation if they intend to enter into 
successful agreements. It is also clear that agreements that exhibit all three elements in high degrees will fail unless 
all relevant parties are signatories to the agreement. This painful reality must guide countries like India, which 
obdurately refuse to include the various separatist elements in Kashmir in peace talks. It is rather late in the day to 
worry that their inclusion will confer them with legitimacy--they are already legitimate in the eyes of their 
constituents and at least Pakistan; and not much is achieved by India's obduracy as long as these movements possess 
the ability to wreak havoc. The successful role played by the World Bank should also embolden countries like India 
to jettison the knee-jerk post-colonial distrust of third-party mediation. The presence of a third-party will strengthen 
delegation, and given its centrality in ensuring success, it is a feature of legalization that must receive greater 
attention in the structuring of agreements between high-conflict states. 
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conciliation or submitted to arbitration.”). 
 
[FN241]. See id. art. VIII. 
 
[FN242]. See id. Annex I, app. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 3. There is an extremely detailed process for withdrawal outlined in 
Appendix to Annex I, Organization of Movements in the Sinai: 
               Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of military movements. 
        a. Notwithstanding the provisions of article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete 
withdrawal from the current J and M lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, 
hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing 
under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this 
Appendix. 
        b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to 
establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining 
a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into 
these areas. 
        c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of 
Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of article II of this Appendix. 
        d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, 
Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of article II of this Appendix, and will function 
in accordance with the provisions of article II of Annex I. 
        e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform 
normal police functions. 
        f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of article II of this 
Appendix. 
        g. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered 
in Annex I will be effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind 
the interim withdrawal line. 
        Id. Annex I, app. art I, ¶ 2. 
 
[FN243]. See id. Annex I, app. art. IV, ¶ 2 (“The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each 
Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when 
discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. 
Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.”). 
 
[FN244]. See id. Annex I, art. I, ¶ 4. 
 
[FN245]. Id. Annex I, art. VII, ¶ 1. Paragraph 3 provides that “[a] direct telephone link between the two offices will 
be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.” Id. 
Annex I, art. VII, ¶ 3. 
 
[FN246]. See id. arts. II-IV. 
 
[FN247]. See id. art. I, ¶ 3. 
 
[FN248]. See id. Annex III, art. 2. 
 
[FN249]. See id. Annex III, art. 3. 
 
[FN250]. See id. Annex III, art. 4. 
 
[FN251]. See id. Annex III, art. 4, ¶ 2. 
 
[FN252]. See id. Annex III, art. 6, ¶ 4. 
 
[FN253]. See id. Annex III, art. 6, ¶ 6. 
 
[FN254]. Id. Annex III, art. 5, ¶ 1. 
 
[FN255]. Press Release, U.S., Egypt & Israel to Launch Historic Trade Partnership, USTR Zoellick to Participate in 
Signing in Cairo (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_ 
Releases/2004/December/United_States,_Egypt_Israel_to_Launch_Historic_Trade_ 
Partnership_USTR_Zoellick_to_Participate_in_Signing_in_Cairo.html. Mr. Zoellick said: “‘This is the most 
important economic agreement between Egypt and Israel in two decades.... It is a concrete, practical result of 
President Bush's plan to promote closer U.S. trade ties with the Middle East so as to strengthen development, 
openness, and peaceful economic links between Israel and its neighbors.”’ Id. One source estimates that 35,000 jobs 
will be created. Jim Phipps et al., Middle Eastern Law, 40 Int'l Law. 597, 602 (2004). 
 
[FN256]. President Sadat was isolated in the Arab world and was assassinated in 1981. 
 
